Harold M Knudsen: James Longstreet and the American Civil War, Kartoniert / Broschiert

Klappentext

Retired Lt. Col. Harold M. Knudsen explores Longstreet's overlooked but significant contributions to modern warfare, revealing his strategic foresight and tactical innovations that foreshadowed future conflicts.

Winner of the 2022 Helen Dortch Longstreet Award and the Mahoning Valley Civil War Round Table 2022 Hugh G. Earnhart Civil War Scholarship Award

The American Civil War is often called the first "modern war." Sandwiched between the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, it spawned a host of "firsts" and is considered a precursor to the larger and more deadly 20th century wars. Confederate Gen. James Longstreet made overlooked but profound modern contributions to the art of war. Retired Lt. Col. Harold M. Knudsen explains what Longstreet did and how he did it in James Longstreet and the American Civil War: The Confederate General Who Fought the Next War.

A careful comparison of Longstreet's body of work in the field to modern military doctrine reveals several large-scale innovations. He understood early that the tactical defense dominated the offense, which was something few grasped in 1862. Longstreet's thinking demonstrated a clear evolution that began at First Manassas in July 1861, developed through the bloody fighting of 1862, and culminated in the brilliant defensive victory at Fredericksburg that December. The lethality with which his riflemen and artillery mowed down repeated Union assaults hinted at what was to come in World War I. Longstreet's ability to launch and control powerful offensives was on display at Second Manassas in August 1862, and his assault plan at Chickamauga in September 1863 was similar, if not the forerunner to, World War II tactical-level German armored tactics. He also demonstrated progressive applications with artillery, staff work, force projection, and operational-level thinking.

Knudsen used 20th century U. S. Army doctrine, field training, staff planning, command, and combat experience to produce this first serious treatment of Longstreet's generalship vis-a-vis modern warfare. Not everyone will agree with Knudsen's conclusions, but it will now be impossible to write about the general without referencing this important study.